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ESSAY
IRAN AND THE LIMITS OF THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
MICHAEL SPIES*

We may face no greater challengefrom a single country thanfrom
Iran.
-National Security Strategy of the United States of America1
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INTRODUCTION
The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy correctly identifies the
threat to international peace and .security posed by the unchecked
global proliferation of advanced nuclear technology. The specific
concern centers around nuclear fuel cycle technology, which
produces the fissile material needed to fuel nuclear power plants.
The very same facilities that produce nuclear fuel can also be used to
produce the fissile materials used in nuclear weapons.3
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
("NPT"), concluded in 1968, is the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts.4 The NPT is unique among global arms control
treaties as it recognizes two classes of states; those states that
manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon prior to January 1,
1967, known as Nuclear Weapon States ("NWS"), and all other
states, known as Non-Nuclear Weapon States ("NNWS").5 The NPT
represents a grand bargain between these two classes of states. The
NNWS, party to the NPT ("NNWS parties"), agreed to not acquire
nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards on all their peaceful
nuclear activities.6 In return, the NWS, party to the NPT ("NWS
2. See id. at 19-20 (stating that the "strategy focuses on controlling fissile
material with two priority objectives," including keeping "states from acquiring the
capability to produce fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons" and
preventing the transfer of fissile material "from states that have this capability to
rogue states or terrorists").
3. See id. at 20 (stating that the first objective requires the closing of a
loophole in the NPT, that allows governments, "under the guise of a civilian
nuclear power program," to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons).
4. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar.
5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
5. See id. art. IX, 21 U.S.T. at 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174; 2 MOHAMED I.
SHAKER,
THE
NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY:
ORIGIN
AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, at 194-99 (1980) (noting that this bifurcation of

states arose from the American and Soviet Union treaty drafts of the NPT).
6. See NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 17172 (compelling NNWS parties "not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices . . . ; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons... ; and not to seek or receive
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons"); id. art. III, 21 U.S.T. at
487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (requiring NNWS parties "to accept safeguards ...
for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
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parties"), agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith to eliminate
their nuclear stockpiles.7 At the core of the crisis currently facing the
nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT upholds the right of all
states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without
discrimination.8
The purpose of the safeguards provided for by the NPT is to verify
the compliance of the NNWS parties with their basic undertaking not
to acquire nuclear weapons.9 In light of the NPT's near absolute
guarantee of the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes, the NPT Safeguards, constructed and administered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA" or "Agency"), are
necessarily constrained in order to maintain balance between the
rights and obligations of the NNWS parties.' 0 These constrictions
highlight the critical importance of accurate and effective assessment
of NPT compliance.
The international community faces a situation in which a state has
been found to be in non-compliance with requirements of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime." International inspectors have chronicled
an eighteen-year history of reporting violations and clandestine
nuclear activities in Iran. 2 To many states these findings have led to
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices").
7. See id. art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173 (expecting all parties
to the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race ... and to nuclear disarmament").

8. See id. art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
9. See id. art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
10. Cf 2 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 728-46 (observing that the IAEA's
verification activities were designed to respect the sovereign rights of states and
not hamper the economic, scientific, or technological development of states parties
to the NPT or international cooperation with nuclear activities for peaceful
purposes).
11. See also John Burroughs, Executive Dir., Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear
Policy, The Iran Situation: Options for the Security Council, Remarks to
Diplomats Representing Some Elected Members of the Security Council (May 2,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/iran.remarksmay2.htm) (indicating that Iran has engaged in a pattern of concealment of
"extensive activities involving all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle").
12. See The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
4, delivered to the Board of
Governors, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67 (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter IAEA Doc.
GOV/2005/67] (finding that Iran failed to report its possession, processing, and use
of nuclear materials, and failed to declare the facilities in which it processed and

404

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[22:401

an absence of confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program." Despite these findings and the concern that it is
secretly pursuing nuclear weapons, Iran continues with its plans to
14
develop an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability with impunity.
This paper explores the legal limitations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, examines the effects of these constrictions on
the mechanisms for compliance assessment and enforcement, and
uses this analysis as a backdrop for assessing the substantive legal
issues pertaining to Iran's nuclear program. Compliance assessment
under the NPT is a flawed process." The problem of Iran is therefore
a problem inherent in the NPT framework. 16 Only effective
multilateralism will be sufficient to solve the crisis we face now and
17
will face in the future.

stored the materials).
13. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, New Worry Rises on Iranian
Claim of Nuclear Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at Al (suggesting that
although Iran constantly asserted its abandonment of projects involving advanced
nuclear technology, known as the P-2 centrifuge, Western analysts speculate that
Iran maintains a second, secret program separate from its main nuclear facility in
Natanz).
14. See id. (noting that Iran's pursuit of a sophisticated method of atomic fuel
development, despite its claim that it is enriching only small amounts of uranium,
has provoked surprise and concern by international nuclear inspectors, who say
Iran may hasten its development of a nuclear weapon through the new method).
15. See infra Part II (discussing how verification and compliance assessment of
the basic non-proliferation undertakings contained in Article III is not
comprehensively provided for by the treaty).
16. See infra Part III (discussing that although the IAEA has chronicled an
eighteen-year history of safeguard violations in Iran and has found that Iran's
policy of concealment breaches its obligation to comply with the NPT, this breach
of the NPT does not satisfy the criteria in the statute of the IAEA and Iran's
Safeguards Agreement which allow the Agency to report the matter to the U.N.
Security Council).
17. See Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir. Gen., IAEA, Statement at the Stanford
University Center for International Security and Cooperation: In Search of
Security: Finding an Alternative to Nuclear Deterrence (Nov. 4, 2004) available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n012.html (concluding
that conflicts and threats to international security, including conflicts regarding the
preservation of the environment "to ensuring respect for human rights, working for
sustainable development, and controlling weapons of mass destruction," "can only
be resolved through a collective and multilateral approach, in which competing
interests and powers can be contained and harmonized").
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I. ARTICLE II AND THE BASIC NONPROLIFERATION OBLIGATION
The basic non-proliferation obligation assumed by NNWS parties
under the NPT is to not acquire nuclear weapons. 8 This obligation is
contained in Article II of the NPT, which states in full:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 19
The NPT envisions two general proliferation scenarios; the
"transfer" of a nuclear weapon from one state to another, and the
"manufacture" of a nuclear weapon.20 Discussed below, the
prohibitions in Article II comprehensively capture both scenarios.
The drafters of the NPT intended for the obligations in Article II to
be free of loopholes, but the NPT suffers from fundamental
verification limitations and nonetheless contains one notable
exception-allowing for nuclear sharing. 2'
The first clause of Article II obliges NNWS parties "not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or

18. See NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
19. Id.

20. See I SHAKER, supra note 5, at 214 (stating that NWS parties agree "not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons" either directly or indirectly). NWS parties
also agree not "to assist, encourage, or induce any [NNWS party] to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices." Id. In turn, NNWS parties agree "not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices." Id.
21. See id. at 215, 268 ("[O]ne serious loop-hole has been left open and that is
the assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices from [NNWS] Parties to the Treaty to [NNWS] not Parties to the
Treaty.").
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explosive devices directly, or indirectly. '22 This implies the transfer
of a completed nuclear explosive device. 23 The transfer of
disassembled components or materials intended for use in a nuclear
weapon is handled by separate provisions.24
Despite the ostensibly categorical prohibition against the
"transfer" of a nuclear weapon, Article II narrowly allows for nuclear
sharing.25 Such arrangements were prevalent in both the NATO and
Warsaw pact alliances at the time the NPT was formulated. Nuclear
sharing allows the stationing of nuclear weapons on the national
territory of a NNWS party. 26 Although an argument can be made to
the contrary, these arrangements are permissible under Article II,
provided that the NNWS party does not exercise "control" over the
weapon. 21 "Control," as it is used in this sense, applies to the
independent ability to use a nuclear weapon.28 Otherwise, the
obligation "not to receive the transfer" of nuclear weapons applies to
weapons that are both based on the national territory of the NNWS
party and on the territory of another state.29

22. NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
23. See 1 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 214-15.
24. See NPT, supra note 4, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172
(stating that states parties agree not to provide "(a) source or special fissionable
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material").
25. See id. art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (lacking a specific
prohibition against NNWS parties' nuclear sharing with states not party to the
NPT).
26. See 1 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 129 (providing that Articles II and III of the
NPT arose out of lengthy bilateral negotiations between the United States and
Soviet Union, which were undertaken to preclude the possibility of nuclear
proliferation through military alliances under NATO). For example, the NPT does
not address the arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied
territory. Id. at 240.
27. See id. at 214-15 (stating that "control" is the key word in Articles I and II
of the NPT and relating it to the problem of nuclear sharing arrangements within
NATO).
28. See id. at 249 (noting that because NWS parties are proscribed from
transferring control over nuclear weapons, NWS parties "cannot give up physical
custody of their nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or provide
sufficient access to them so that they could be taken away by anyone else; nor can
the [NWS parties] give up their power to make the final decision on firing their
nuclear weapons").
29. NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171; see 1
SHAKER, supra note 5, at 248-49.

2007]

IRAN AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA TION

407

The use of the term "other nuclear explosive devices" in
conjunction with the term "nuclear weapons" throughout the NPT
precludes states from acquiring a nuclear weapon by "legally"
building a nuclear explosive for so-called peaceful purposes.30 The
drafters of the NPT recognized that there is no fundamental physical
distinction between a nuclear explosive for peaceful or military use.3
The NPT thus categorically bans the proliferation of all nuclear
explosives, regardless of professed intent.
The second clause of Article II is the most problematic in terms of
verification and compliance assessment. This provision obliges
NNWS parties "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."32 The terms
"manufacture" and "acquisition" suggest a completed nuclear
explosive device, similar to the first clause, as some negotiating
parties had originally remarked.33 If this interpretation is accepted, it
would allow for the NNWS parties to construct all the parts of a
nuclear explosive without assembling the finished device and still
remain within the bounds of the NPT.34
Although such a narrow interpretation of "manufacture" is not
accepted by the states parties, the lack of definitive criteria for what
constitutes "manufacture" continues to be an issue in the context of
compliance assessment.35 During the 2005 NPT Review Conference
30. See NPT, supra note 4, art. Il1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
31. See I SHAKER, supra note 5, at 203-04 (pointing out that delegates
reasoned that "no State could develop a capability of detonating nuclear devices
for peaceful purposes without also acquiring a capability of detonating nuclear
weapons").
32. See NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171
(requiring NNWS parties to not "manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices").
33. See 1 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 250 (summarizing remarks from negotiating
parties which stated that they could interpret the language as to not cover
incomplete nuclear devices such as the "exploitation of uranium deposits,
enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or the
manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water when the processes are carried out for
civil purposes").
34. But see id. at 250-51 (suggesting that constructing a prototype nuclear
device or components that could only be used for the production of a nuclear
explosive device would constitute "manufacture" under Article II of the NPT,
although placing "a particular activity under safeguards" might help to remove
suspicion of non-compliance).
35. See id. at 249-51 (discussing how states parties have differing views on
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a U.S. diplomat noted, "[i]n an extreme case, an NPT party might
have manufactured an entire mockup of the non-nuclear shell of a
nuclear explosive, while continuing to observe its safeguards
obligations on all nuclear material. 3 6 The U.S. diplomat suggested a
list of activities of concern which would indicate an "intent" to
3 These
manufacture a nuclear weapon in violation of Article I.
activities include
seeking certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to
nuclear weapons, such as enrichment or reprocessing, with no
clear economic or peaceful justification; clandestine facilities
and procurements; committing safeguards violations and
failing to cooperat[e] with the IAEA to remedy them; and
using denial and deception tactics to conceal nuclear-related
activities.3"
Despite the reasonable case for the need of criteria to assess
compliance with Article II, the nature of nuclear energy, the balance
of rights and obligations in the NPT, and the particular circumstance
and purpose of any given nuclear program provide serious confounds
to straight-forward compliance assessment. It is conceivable for a
state to engage in the activities listed above without necessarily
attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, the same fuel
cycle facilities used in a civilian program, which all states are
entitled to pursue under the NPT,3 9 can be used in a weapons
program. 40 A state may have many reasons to pursue nuclear
what constitutes "manufacture" under Article II and on what is considered to be a

violation of the prohibitions in Article II).
36. Jackie W. Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Ambassador, Statement to the 2005

Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
at
available
(transcript
2005)
19,
(May
http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/46557/htm).
37. See id. (arguing that regardless of whether a "safeguards violation" has
occurred under Article III of the NPT, it is crucial to establish "whether all the
facts of a case tend to point toward an intent to manufacture or acquire nuclear
weapons").
38. Id.
39. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
40. See, e.g., Zachary R. Dowdy, A Standoff Over Iran; Ahmadinejad's
Continuing Defiance Over its Nuclear Efforts May Force the UN to Impose
Sanctions, NEWSDAY, Sept. 1, 2006, at A07 (stating that enriched uranium's

nuclear energy can be used for "heating and other utilitarian purposes," but it may
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programs, including the prestige gained from mastering an advanced
technology and legitimate non-weapons military use such as naval
propulsion, among many other conceivable reasons. Many state
activities, such as defense and general welfare spending, can lack a
strict economic justification from a critical outsider point of view,
but such programs remain legitimate due to widespread domestic
support and other subjective considerations.4'
During the negotiation of the NPT, a rejected Russian draft of
Article II included a prohibition against the "preparation" for the
manufacture of a nuclear weapon. 42 Although the term "preparation"
would have been subject to a similar problem of interpretation and
verifiability, it would have nonetheless created a higher threshold of
assurance against states seeking to legally acquire nuclear weapons
43
capability.

Despite the lack of a definitive interpretation of the term
"manufacture," the prevailing interpretation of Article II is that the
many activities a state must undertake to eventually construct a
nuclear explosive, thereby indicating non-compliance with Article II,
would necessarily involve violating specific provisions in Article
III.44 Specifically, nuclear weapons require fissile material, 45 which
must be placed under safeguards.46 As is discussed in the next

section, despite the information a state must provide on its nuclear
also be further refined to produce weapons-grade nuclear material with the
potential to power a bomb).
41. E.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Dennis E. Logue, Jr., Separationof Powers
and the 1995-1996 Budget Impasse, 16 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 55 (1996)
(explaining that U.S. government spending is often based on political motives
rather than strict economic justifications).
42. 1 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 249 (observing the Soviet draft language
"envisaged the undertaking by the States 'not possessing nuclear weapons' not to
'prepare for the manufacture' of nuclear weapons").
43. Id. at 254.
44. E.g., id. at 251 ("Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of
fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II
so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III.").
45. For an explanation of the difference between fissile and fissionable material
see International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile MaterialReport 2006,
availableat http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site down/ipfmreport06.pdf.
46. See NPT, supra note 4, art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172
(requiring Article III safeguards on "all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction,
or carried out under its control anywhere").
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program pursuant to its safeguards,47 compliance assessment in this
regard can still be a highly subjective endeavor.
The third clause of Article II obliges NNWS parties "not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. ' 48 The primary effect of this
obligation is to allow states to adopt a cooperative approach to
proliferation, independently acquiring or purchasing the particular
components of a nuclear weapon from one or more other states.4 9

II. ARTICLE III AND THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM:
COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT
Article III of the NPT does not provide a comprehensive
mechanism for verification and compliance assessment of basic nonproliferation undertakings. The non-proliferation obligations it
provides differ in their verifiability, or in the ability of the states
parties to maintain confidence that all NNWS parties are in
compliance with their obligations.5 0 At the time the NPT was
negotiated, it was believed to be impossible to detect the presence of
a completed nuclear weapon that might have been clandestinely
transferred from one state to another.5 1 Therefore the verification
component of the NPT contained in Article III is silent on the issue
of the transfer of nuclear weapons from one state to another. 2
A. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION IN ARTICLE III

The verification component of the NPT deals exclusively with the
second proliferation scenario, where a state seeks to manufacture its

47. See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. IX.C, Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1102-04, 276 U.N.T.S. 18-22 [hereinafter IAEA Statute]

(requiring member states to notify the IAEA "of the quantities, form, and
composition of special fissionable materials, source materials, and other
materials").
48. NPT, supra note 4, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See 2 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 734.
See NPT, supra note 4, art. 111, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
See I SHAKER, supra note 5, at 7.
See NPT, supra note 4, art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
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own nuclear weapon.53 The safeguards provided for in the NPT only
indirectly verify compliance with the obligation not to manufacture a
nuclear weapon. Article III contains the safeguards provisions which
form the backbone of verification and compliance assessment under
the NPT.54 These safeguards deal exclusively with the disposition of
nuclear materials, creating a second set of obligations applicable only
to NNWS parties.55 Following from the issues highlighted above and
the balance between rights and obligations inherent in the NPT, the
safeguards provided for in Article III suffer from several limitations;
including the scope of the verification mandate, uncertainty arising
from limits in the technical capacity to draw safeguards conclusions,
the lack of enforcement provisions, and the strong protections on the
56
right of states to develop nuclear energy programs.
The NPT Safeguards regime draws its authority from three
overlapping and complementary sources; Article III of the NPT,57 the
Statute of the IAEA ("IAEA Statute"),5 8 and the IAEA safeguards
system. Article 111.1 of the NPT contains the basic safeguards
obligation for NNWS parties and delimits the scope of the
safeguards.5 9 Procedures for the safeguards are based on the IAEA
Model Comprehensive
Safeguards
Agreement ("Safeguards
Agreement"), devised by the IAEA for the exclusive purpose of
fulfilling its role under the NPT. 6° The IAEA Statute defines the
extent of the Agency's mandate and the procedures for verification
and compliance enforcement.61

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. art. 111.2, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172 (prohibiting states
parties from providing: "(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this article").
56. See NPT, supra note 4, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
57. See id.
58. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.

59. See NPT, supra note 4, art. H1.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
60. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Structure and Content of
Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153
(June 1972) [hereinafter Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement].
61. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
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The provisions for safeguards are mandatory only to NNWS
parties. The basic safeguards obligation is contained in Article 111. 1:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreement to
be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification
of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article
shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable
material whether it is being produced, processed or used in
any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility.
The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of such State, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.62
The objective and scope of the safeguards are restricted in a
number of ways. As specified by the Article III. 1, the "exclusive
purpose" of safeguards is the "verification of the fulfillment of [a
state's] obligations assumed under [the NPT] with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."63 The next clause
refines the scope of the safeguards from the vague term "nuclear
energy," to "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful
nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. '
B. THE SCOPE OF THE SAFEGUARDS REGIME UNDER THE NPT AND
RESTRICTIONS THEREON

The scope of the IAEA safeguards system, restricted to nuclear
materials, effectively places the non-nuclear components of a
potential nuclear weapons program outside the purview of the

62. NPT, supra note 4, art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Agency." Absent a nexus to nuclear material, the Agency lacks the
authority to conduct inspections or other verification activities.66
Aspects of a suspected nuclear weapons program that fall outside the
mandate of the safeguards agreement can include all the non-nuclear
components that comprise a nuclear explosive, such as the chemical
high-explosive packages all nuclear weapons require to detonate and
delivery systems.
The objective of safeguards is further restricted by the IAEA
safeguards system to:
[T]he timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and
deterrence of such
6
diversion by the risk of early detection. 1
In this respect the IAEA safeguards system contrasts with the term
"preventing diversion" stated in Article 111.1 of the NPT.6 8 In
application, safeguards measures do not equate to physical measures,
which are not provided for by either the IAEA Statute or the IAEA's
safeguards system.6 9 In practice, prevention equates to the deterrent
effect of safeguards against cheating behavior. According to this
rationale, the risk of detection-and the subsequent possibility of
being subject to enforcement action by the international
community-deters a state from diverting nuclear materials to nonpeaceful purposes.70
65. See Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 60.
66. See The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
35, delivered to the Board of
Governors, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27 (Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter IAEA Doe.
GOV/2006/27] (observing that Iran's ability to confine the IAEA to the Safeguards
Agreement limits and restricts "Agency access to activities not involving nuclear

material").
67. Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, supra note 60, 28.
68. NPT, supra note 4, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
69. See 2 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 733.
70. See David S. Jonas, Variations On Non-Nuclear: May the "FinalFour"
Join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While
Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 417, 434 (noting that
the NPT does not allow new NWS parties because by definition, a NWS party is "a
state that exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967," which consequently
eliminates a state's incentive to develop nuclear weapons).
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In one circumstance safeguards procedures are binding on states
not party to the NPT.7' The export of fissionable material from a
NPT state party must be safeguarded, regardless of destination.
Article 111.2 provides that:
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a)
source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material, to any nonnuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this article.73
Therefore, if a NPT state party exports fissionable material to a
non-NPT state party, the nuclear material must remain under
safeguard.7 4 In practice, this necessitates the non-NPT recipient state
to conclude a separate agreement with the IAEA for this purpose. 5
The NPT expressly attempts to balance the rights and obligations
of NNWS parties.7 6 Article IV.1 provides that:
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
articles I and II of this Treaty.77
Crucial to the remainder of this review, Article IV is interpreted to
allow all states to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle without
restriction.78 Due to the nature of nuclear technology, any civilian

71. See 2 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 734 (explaining that Article 111.2 is binding
on a state that is not party to the NPT, where the state is "self-sufficient in uranium
but needs to import equipment to build reactors and reprocessing plants").
72. See NPT, supra note 4, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
73. Id. art. 111.2, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
74. See 2 SHAKER, supra note 5, at 734.
75. See id.
76. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
77. Id. art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
78. See H.E. Rajmah Hussain, Ambassador and Resident Representative of
Malaysia to the IAEA, Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement at the IAEA
Board of Governors' Meeting (Feb. 2, 2006).

2007]

IRAN AND NUCLEAR NON-PR OLIFERA TION

415

fuel cycle facility can be used directly for military purposes.7 9 Thus
any state pursuing an advanced nuclear fuel cycle capacity also
attains the capacity to acquire a nuclear arsenal within a short
timeframe.8 ° The strong language in Article IV directly limits the
scope of verification and enforcement measures permitted by the
treaty, illustrated by Article 111.3:
The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented
in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty,
and to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of the Parties or international cooperation in the
field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international
exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the
processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and
the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the
Treaty."1
These limitations, based on the sovereign right of states to
technological development, lead to some of the apparent deficiencies
in the verification regime. The "inalienable right" to technological
development in Article IV only becomes forfeit for a NNWS party
after a violation of Article 11.82 Further, violation and non-compliance
with safeguards can lead to a forfeiture of Article IV rights only if
those violations include diversion of materials to use in nuclear
weapons.8 3

79. See James Stemgold, Iran Celebrates Uranium Enrichment; Experts Say
Nuclear Step Means Tehran Is Serious, but Weapon Is Years Off, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Apr. 12, 2006, at Al (explaining that a country can produce weaponsgrade uranium by using the same process for civilian uranium on a much larger
scale).
80. See Thomas B. Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council, Adequacy of
IAEA's Safeguardsfor Achieving Timely Detection 8 (Oct. 2-3, 2005) (presented
at a conference After Iran: SafeguardingPeacefulNuclear Energy).
81. NPT, supra note 4, art. 111.3, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
82. Id. art. IV.l, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The "inalienable right"
to develop peaceful nuclear energy must be in conformity with articles I and II of
the NPT. Id.
83. See id. art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-173 (noting that the
accepted safeguards fulfill states parties' obligation "of preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices").
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The balance between rights and obligations leads to difficult
questions of accountability and enforcement within the NPT regime.
Article 111.1 provides that "[p]rocedures for the safeguards required
by this article shall befollowed." This language establishes that, in
addition to the obligation to conclude safeguards, the proceduresfor
safeguards are also binding on NNWS parties. The significance of
these multiple obligations, in addition to the requirement that
exported fissionable materials must remain under safeguards, is that
it becomes possible for a state to be in non-compliance with its
obligations under Article III without violating its basic obligations
under Article 11.85 Due to the restricted scope and objective of the
NPT Safeguards, violation or non-compliance with the obligations in
Article III does not automatically equate to a violation of Article 11.16
Yet, the NPT only provides penalties for states that violate Article
11.7 Thus it is possible for a state to violate Article III with legal
impunity, provided the violation is not connected to the development
of a nuclear weapons program.
Article IV allows states to develop an industrial nuclear capacity
up to the threshold of nuclear weapons status.88 The necessity of
maintaining balance between the rights and obligations of states
parties presents great difficultly in matters of compliance assessment
and enforcement. These concerns translate into an extensive gray
area between peaceful and non-peaceful activities in circumstances
of safeguards and NPT violations. Ultimately, the responsibility for
compliance assessment and enforcement falls on the IAEA and NPT
states parties. But where these bodies lack the legal authority or
political will to act, responsibility falls on the U.N. Security Council
as the guarantor of international peace and security s9

84. Id. art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
85. See id. art. 11, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (stating the basic

obligations of a state party to the NPT are not to receive nuclear weapons, not to
manufacture nuclear weapons, and not to seek assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons).
86. See Burroughs, supra note 11 (emphasizing that the limitations of nuclear
safeguards stem from the lack of a NPT governance structure).
87. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
88. See id.
89. See id. art. 111, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 6-8 (stating that, in the

event of disagreement, "the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
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The limitations of the scope of safeguards highlight the
importance of accurate compliance assessment of safeguards. For
each state implementing safeguards, the IAEA annually certifies that
no declared nuclear material has been diverted to military use.9 0 The
conclusion that no diversion has occurred provides verification that
the state in question is in compliance with its basic safeguards
obligation not to divert nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. 9'
Such a conclusion further indicates that the state is in compliance
with its obligation under Article III of the NPT to apply and follow
safeguards procedures. 92
Under the NPT Safeguards, as it was originally devised, the IAEA
lacks a mandate to detect the presence of undeclared nuclear
activities.93 However, the Additional Protocol, approved by the
Board in 1997, allows the IAEA to collect local-area environmental
samples from any site, regardless of whether it has been declared to
the Agency in accordance with safeguards procedures. 94 The IAEA
may also visit locations it specifies in order to conduct wide-area
environmental samples. 95 By design, this expanded inspection
capability allows the Agency to reasonably certify that there are no
undeclared nuclear activities present in a given location.9 6 The
Agency acknowledges that in cases where substantial concealment
has occurred, certifying the absence of undeclared nuclear activity
could be a lengthy process.9 7 However, it is the considered view of
security").
90. See IAEA, Annual Report for 2004, at 62, IAEA Doc. GC (49)/5 (2005)
[hereinafter Annual Report 2004].
91. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S.
at 26 (stating that the Agency has the right to ensure that "diversion of materials
for military purposes" does not occur).
92. See NPT, supra note 4, art. 111. 1,21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
93. See id.
94. See IAEA, Model ProtocolAdditional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s)
and the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,art.
6(a), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter Model Additional
Protocol].
95. See id. art. 5(c).
96. See id. art. 4(a)(i).
97. See David Sloss, It's Not Broken, So Don 't Fix It: The InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 841, 856-861 (1995) (outlining steps of the lengthy special
investigations process, which includes obtaining the state's permission for access
to certain undeclared locations and referring disputes to the Board or an arbitral
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the Agency that a rigorous and universally applied inspection routine
should be sufficient to credibly ensure verification. 9
For states that implement the Additional Protocol, the IAEA
annually certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or
activities. 99 As the IAEA has remarked in its assessments of Iran's
safeguards status, arriving at the initial conclusion that there are no
undeclared nuclear activities takes a great deal of time for all states
in any circumstance.' 00 For example, North Korea's Additional
Protocol entered into force prior to 1993, yet the IAEA concluded the
absence of undeclared nuclear activities in North Korea for the first
time in 2003.101 As of the 2005 annual IAEA Safeguards Report, the
IAEA has concluded the absence of undeclared nuclear activity in
only twenty-four of the seventy states in which both the NPT
02
Safeguards and the Additional Protocol are implemented.
C. ENFORCEMENT MEASURES UNDER THE NPT
Measures for enforcement are notably lacking in the NPT, the
safeguards system, and the IAEA Statute. There are no enforcement
measures provided for in the NPT and no enumerated penalties for
non-compliance.0 3 As the only article that provides a possibility for
sanctions within the NPT framework, Article IV stipulates that the
rights of states to develop peaceful nuclear technology is contingent
on their compliance with Articles I and HI.14 But the NPT lacks a
standing executive body to oversee the implementation of the NPT
and has no mechanism to assess compliance with its provisions.105

tribunal where access is denied).
98. See id. at 860 (arguing that the NPT grants the IAEA far-reaching authority
to inspect sites and that Director General Blix maintains that a state cannot refuse
the IAEA from inspecting a site).
99. See Annual Report 2004, supra note 90, at 62.
100. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, supra note 12, 51.
101. See IAEA, Annual Report 2003, at 53, IAEA Doc. GC (48)/3 (2004).
102. See IAEA, Safeguards Statement for 2005, f 1,8 (2006), available at
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2005.pdf [hereinafter Safeguards
Statementfor 2005].
103. See Fred Kaplan, The Real Nuclear Option, SLATE MAGAZINE, May 3,
2005, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2117940 (arguing that a critical
problem with the NPT is that it lacks a general enforcement clause).
104. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
105. But see Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Is InternationalLaw Relevant To Arms
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Thus, the matter of compliance enforcement falls to the states parties,
which at present meet only every five years to review the
implementation of the NPT.10 6 Even if the parties to the Review
Conferences were to take up the issue of enforcement, they would
lack the tools to implement their judgments, such as the power to
levy sanctions or to take police actions. 1 7
Under the safeguards system and IAEA Statute, there are only
limited enforcement measures the Agency may take in the event of
non-compliance. 08 If a NNWS party is found to have diverted
nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, the Agency may
direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided
by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of
materials and equipment made available to the recipient
member or group of members. The Agency may also, in
accordance with article XIX, suspend any non-complying
member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership. °9
While these provisions might be an adequate guard against the
misuse of nuclear materials provided under the auspices of the
IAEA, they do not address the circumstances where a state has
diverted nuclear material using indigenous materials and equipment,
as was the case in North Korea."' These measures would thus be
inadequate to stop a determined proliferator, who would be more
likely to attempt to develop indigenous technology in secret, rather

Control?: Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in MultilateralArms Control: Some
Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 73-74 (2003) (claiming that
although "[f]ormal systems of sanctions for noncompliance in the arms control
field are rare," the NPT contains an "automatic sanction built into the treaty for
parties that violate IAEA safeguards").
106. See NPT, supra note 4, art. VIII, 21 U.S.T. at 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
107. See Kaplan, supra note 103.
108. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276
U.N.T.S. at 30 (indicating that the Board of Governors will first give an
opportunity for "the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a
reasonable time").
109. Id.
110. See Erik Raines, North Korea: Analyzing the "New" Nuclear Threat, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349, 365-68 (2004).
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than use IAEA loaned material and equipment that would be
monitored in accordance with the safeguards provisions.III
The IAEA Board of Governors ("Board") is the decision making
body tasked with assessing compliance with the Safeguards
Agreements and the IAEA Statute.' 1 2 The Board's authority to report
cases to the Security Council is found in Article XII.C of the IAEA
Statute" 3 and Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement." 4 Article
XII.C was originally intended to deal only with safeguards and safety
compliance specifically involving Agency projects, for example an
IAEA supplied reactor to produce medical isotopes operated with the
assistance of the Agency. 5 This section begins:
The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of
obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in subparagraph A-6 of this article and of determining whether
there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in subparagraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in
sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other
conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between
the Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors
shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who
shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of
Governors. 116
This criteria and definition for non-compliance should not be
confused with the criteria defined in Article 19 of the Safeguards
Agreement." 7 Non-compliance, as it is defined under Article XII.C,
111. See id. at 366-68.
112. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276
U.N.T.S. at 30 (allowing the Board to "call upon the recipient State or States to
remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred"); Model
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, supra note 60, 19 (requiring the Board,

in relation to verification of non-diversion, to "take account of the degree of
assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall

afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any
necessary reassurance").
113. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S.
at 30.
114. See Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 60, 19.
115. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S.

at 28-30.
116. Id.
117. See Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, supra note 60,

19
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requires a finding that nuclear material provided for an Agency
project has been diverted for military purposes,"' violations of health
and safety regulations," 9 or other violations of conditions of an
Agency project. 2° This narrow definition does not include activities
a state undertakes under its own initiative, such as the operation of
power plants and fuel cycle facilities.
The NPT Safeguards compliance assessment mechanism is
comprised of two components. The triggering clause, contained in
Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement, contains the criteria for
findings of non-compliance.' 12 The reporting clause, contained in
Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, contains the procedures for
handling cases of non-compliance and the authority for reporting
122
cases to the U.N. Security Council.
As the triggering mechanism, Article 19 of the Safeguards
Agreement grants the Agency authority to judge and enforce
compliance with its provisions:
[I]f the Board upon examination of relevant information
reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is
not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear
material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may
make the reports provided
for in paragraph C of Article XII
23
of the [IAEA] Statute ....

(explaining that "if the Board ... finds that the Agency is not able to verify that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under
the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make
the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute").
118. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, arts. XI, XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105, 1107, 276
U.N.T.S. at 26-28.
119. See id. art. XII.A, C, 8 U.S.T. at 1106-07, 276 U.N.T.S. at 26-28.
120. See id. art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28-30.
121. See Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 60, 19.
122. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S.
at 30 (describing the chain of command for reporting non-compliance). All reports
begin with IAEA inspectors, who must report any non-compliance to the Director
General; the Director General in turn reports the noncompliance to the Board; the
Board is then responsible for reporting the non-compliance to all IAEA members,
the Security Council, and the U.N. General Assembly. Id.
123. Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 60, 19.
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Per its authority under the Safeguards Agreement, the Board may
only report a state to the Security Council if it finds that, based on
the report from the Director General, the Board cannot be assured
that the state has not diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful
purposes. 124 These provisions make clear that the only relevant
consideration behind a finding of non-compliance in the context of
safeguards is the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes.
Any other breach of the Safeguards Agreement can only amount to
non-compliance as far as it affects the Board's ability to verify that
there has been no diversion.
The language of the IAEA Statute entitles the Board to come to its
own judgment, based on the information provided to it by the
Director General, on whether it can be assured that no material has
been diverted. 25 So it is conceivable that, although the Agency
inspectors might not physically detect diverted materials or otherwise
have their activities hindered by the target state, the Board may still
find that it cannot be assured that no diversion has occurred. Thus the
Board is not constrained to act or make findings consistent with what
the Agency reports to it and may elect to report a case to the Security
26
Council by a simple majority of members voting and present.1
On the matter of enforcement, the Board has very limited authority
to respond proactively to actual or suspected cases of nonverification with the non-diversion of nuclear materials.127 Under the
NPT Safeguards:
[I]f the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides
that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to
ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards
under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or

124. See id.
125. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107-08, 276
U.N.T.S. at 28-30 ("The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to
remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred.").
126. See IAEA, ProvisionalRules of Procedureof the Board of Governors, R.
37 (Feb. 23,
1989), http://www.iaea.org/about/policy/board/bgrutesl/html
[hereinafter ProvisionalRules].
127. See Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 60, 18.
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other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call
28
upon the State to take the required action without delay....
However, this clause, allowing the Board to call upon a state to
take action, is limited to instances when such action is deemed
necessary to prevent the diversion of nuclear material. If a state fails
to heed such a call, the Board is left to its own judgment, based upon
the report of the Director General, to determine whether or not the
Board is "able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear
' 29 In this instance,
material."'
the Director General is likely to report
the non-compliance to the Board. The Board, being unable to verify
any lack of diversion, is obliged to report the matter to the U.N.
Security Council pursuant to its authority under Article XII.C of the
IAEA Statute. 30
Separately, Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute empowers the
IAEA to submit a report to the Security Council "if in connexion
with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are
within the competence of the Security Council,... as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security."'' While this provision does not require a
finding of non-compliance with safeguards, its proper application
would naturally be interpreted in light of the Safeguards Agreement
and other provisions of the IAEA Statute. Thus any basis other than
diversion or uncertainty about diversion requires justification.
The Board has some innovative potential to enact coercive
measures in response to cases of concern that do not involve
diversion of nuclear materials. Specifically, in deciding whether to
approve any request made by a member state for a technical
cooperation project, the Board may consider any such matter it may
deem relevant, a catch-all phrase that in effect leaves the matter
entirely to the conceivably arbitrary judgment of the Board.'3 2
Though such a mechanism could easily be susceptible to political
abuse, it gives the Board some leverage over member states by
128. Id.
129. Id. 19.
130. IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at

30.
131. Id. art. I1I.B.4, 8 U.S.T. at 1096-97, 276 U.N.T.S. at 8.
132. Id. art. XI.E.7, 8 U.S.T. at 1105,276 U.N.T.S. at 26.
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allowing it to obstruct a key membership privilege, provided it
makes some justification that is reasonable enough to secure a
majority vote.
In cases where a state has persistently violated the provisions of
the Statute or conditions related to a project, but that do not involve
diversion, it is also possible for Board to vote by simple majority to
recommend for a state to have its member rights and privileges
suspended.'33 In order to enact the suspension, the General
Conference, consisting of the entire membership of the IAEA and
which meets only once a year in the fall, would have to approve the
measure by a two-thirds vote.'34

III. IRAN: THE FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE NPT
A. IAEA BOARD'S ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION FINDING IRAN IN
VIOLATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
The Board adopted a resolution on September 24, 2005 finding
"that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply
with its NPT Safeguards Agreement... constitute non compliance in
the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute." '35 Lacking the
consensus by which the Board customarily makes its decisions, the
United States, European Union ("E.U."), and E3 States (Britain,
France, Germany), which lobbied for the adoption of this resolution,
generated sufficient votes on the thirty-five member Board to adopt
the resolution with a simple majority.'36 The vote broke down largely
along North-South lines, with the majority of Non-Aligned states
abstaining from the vote. 137 As a surprise to many analysts, India, a
133. Id. art. XIX.B, 8 U.S.T. at 1111, 276 U.N.T.S. at 36-38.
134. Id.
135. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 24 September 2005, art. 1, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77].
136. See ProvisionalRules, supra note 126, R. 37.
137. For (22): Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ecuador, France,
Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, UK, USA. Against (1):
Venezuela. Abstaining (12): Algeria, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Vietnam. See SHARON SQUASSONI,
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long time ally of Iran, voted in favor of the resolution, a likely
indication of the heightened priority of its strengthening bilateral ties
with the United States.'38
The language of the Board's finding is not consistent with the
relevant provision of the IAEA Statute. Operative paragraph 1 of the
resolution finds Iran's past breaches of its NPT Safeguards, as
detailed in a two-year old Agency report, to "constitute
non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's
Statute."' 3 9 Noted above, a finding of non-compliance, as the term is
used in Article XII.C, pertains to circumstances when nuclear
material provided in an Agency project has been diverted for military
purposes, health and safety violations, or any other condition of an
Agency project proscribed by agreement. a° Although Iran has
several ongoing projects of the IAEA, including assistance in
preparations for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the IAEA has
not accused Iran of diverting nuclear material from any project.' 4 '
Nor has Iran been accused of any safety and health violations or of
any other infraction of any condition stipulated in any agreement
pertaining to an IAEA project. Therefore, the finding of noncompliance made by the Board is vague and has no basis in the
IAEA Statute.
Moreover, the IAEA resolution did not find Iran to be in noncompliance with its NPT mandated Safeguards Agreement.' The
IAEA has chronicled an eighteen-year history of safeguards
violations in Iran, finding that Iran's policy of concealment "resulted

NUCLEAR PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS,
CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS Order Code RS21592, at 5 n. 17 (2006).
138. See id.
139. IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77, supra note 135, art. 1.
140. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. XII.C, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S.
at 28-30.
141. See Paul Kerr, IAEA Presses Iran to Comply With Nuclear Safeguards,
ARMS
CONTROL
TODAY,
July/Aug.
2003,
available
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-07-08/iran_,julaug03.asp (observing Iran's
efforts to build a further nuclear power plant at Bushehr and the IAEA's concern
over Iran's lack of reporting nuclear material; however, the IAEA's statement
"stop[ped] short of saying that Iran is in violation of [the IAEA's] safeguards
agreement," which ensures that member states do not divert peaceful civilian
IRAN'S

nuclear programs for military purposes).
142. Id.
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in many breaches of its obligation to comply with [its Safeguards]
Agreement."'' 4 But this finding does not satisfy the criteria in the
Safeguards Agreement allowing for the Agency to report the matter
to the U.N. Security Council. Iran's Safeguards Agreement provides
that the Board may report a matter to the Security Council only if it
finds that, based on the report from the Director General, the Board
"is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear
1' 44
material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement.'
Puzzlingly the Board resolution did not cite this report or more
recent IAEA reports on Iran's nuclear program, but rather cited a
two-year report dated November 10, 2003.14 The Director General
reported in November 2004, for the first time since beginning its
investigation in Iran, that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran
has been accounted for, and that such material is not diverted to
prohibited activities.' 46 Moreover, the Board's resolution does not
147
assert any uncertainty regarding the diversion of nuclear materials.
Previous Board findings of non-compliance have come in the face of
active and ongoing non-cooperation with IAEA inspections,
preventing the Agency from judging whether nuclear material had
48
been diverted to military use. 1

This was the basis for the Board referral of the North Korean
situation to the Security Council on February 12, 2003.149 In its
143. The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 107, delivered to the Board of Governors, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2004/83 (Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83].
144. IAEA, Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, art. 19, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974)
[hereinafter Iran Safeguards Agreement].
145. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77, supra note 135, art. 1 (citing IAEA Doc.
GOV/2003/75).
146. IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83, supra note 143, 112.
147. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77, supra note 135, art. 2 (failing to specifically
assert a finding of diversion to non-peaceful purposes, but finding an "absence of
confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes").
148. See IAEA, Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the
Resolution Adopted by the Board on 6 January 2003 and of the Agreement
Between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
1, 9-10, delivered to the Board of Governors, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2003/4 (Jan. 22, 2003).
149. See IAEA, IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in
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resolution, the Board reported that "as provided for in Article XII.C.
of the Statute, through the Director General, the DPRK's noncompliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of
nuclear material subject to safeguards, to all Members of the Agency
and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United
Nations." 15 0
Despite the dissonance between the Board's findings and the
criteria in the Safeguards Agreement for reporting Iran to the
Security Council, the Board's decision relied on a novel legal basis.
The resolution separately found that the "absence of confidence that
Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes ha[s]
given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security
Council."15 '
Noted above, the finding of non-compliance rested in Article
XII.C, whereas a finding of non-compliance and Security Council
referral under the Safeguards Agreement requires the diversion of
nuclear material to military purposes. 52 Failing to meet this criterion
for Security Council referral under the Safeguards Agreement, the
Board utilized the broader language of Article III.B.4 of the IAEA
Statute.'53 Although there is evidence that this provision was
originally intended to be utilized in the context of the application of
safeguards, a broad interpretation allows the Board to circumvent the
narrow reporting clause contained in the Safeguards Agreement.'5 4

North
Korea,
(Feb.
12,
2003),
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/med-advise_048.shtml.
150. Id. e.
151. IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77, supra note 135, art. 2; see also IAEA Statute,
supra note 47, art. III.B.4 (allowing the IAEA to submit reports to the U.N.

Security Council for issues within the Security Council's competence).
152. Iran SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 144, art. 19 (allowing the Board, if
it "finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, . . . [to] make
the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the
Agency").

153. See IAEA Statute, supra note 47, art. Il.B, 8 U.S.T. at 1096, 276 U.N.T.S.
at 8.
154. See DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 37 (1997) (stating that the reporting
requirement under Article III.B.4 was proposed by the Soviet Union specifically to
allay its concern that the application of the safeguards could raise international

security issues).
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In light of the circumstances of this non-compliance finding, there
arise questions as to its legal implications and significance. Iran was
not found to be in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement as
there has been no diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful
purposes.'55 This also means that the IAEA has not made any
findings that bear on Article II of the NPT. Yet Article III of the NPT
provides that safeguards procedures "shall be followed."'5 6 Thus Iran
has violated its obligations under the NPT.
Yet, despite ongoing suspicion regarding Iran's intentions, these
violations have not risen to the level where an argument can be made
that Iran has forfeited it rights under Article IV. The Non-Aligned
states in particular have sought to uphold the rights of NNWS parties
under Article IV.' 57 At the meeting of the Board on February 2, 2006
the Non-Aligned Movement stated "that any rightful nuclear activity
' 58
under the Agency's safeguard does not constitute any concern."'
This attitude reflects the present legal and political reality of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. States parties are unable to take
action, even in the face of egregious violations and non-compliance,
unless there is evidence of a weapons program.159 Thus, the February
2006 finding of the IAEA has little impact on Iran's rights under
Article IV of the NPT.
B. IAEA

INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND DECLARATIONS

There are two additional, but related, substantive issues that bear
on Iran's legal obligations under the NPT and its Safeguards
155. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83, supra note 143,

112-13.

156. NPT, supra note 4, art. 111.1, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
157. See Hussain, supra note 78, 3.
158. Id. T12.
159. See The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
54, delivered to the Board of
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Governors, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15 (Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter IAEA Doe.

GOV/2006/I5] (stating that the investigation into the scope of the purpose of Iran's
nuclear program goes beyond the "formal legal requirements of the Safeguards
Agreement and Additional Protocol" and can only continue effectively with Iran's
cooperation); see also Hussain, supra note 78,
9, 14 (asserting that with the
finding of no diversion of nuclear materials to prohibited activities, that "any
request for additional legal authority" on behalf of the IAEA for ongoing issues in
Iran must be negotiated by Member States).
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Agreement. The first is the IAEA's finding that it is not yet "in a
position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran."' 6 0 The second is the ongoing IAEA investigation
into discrepancies in Iran's past activities and declarations.161 These
two outstanding issues have been subject to varying interpretations.
Hawks in Washington take the position that the IAEA has not been
able to confirm the absence of a military nuclear program in Iran
after three years.1 62 More cautious observers state, at the very least,
that this indicates Iran's nuclear file has not been given a clean bill of
health by the IAEA. 163 Either way, the implication, stronger or
weaker depending on the observer, is that Iran must or might be
hiding a weapons program. Both these viewpoints are misleading.
Noted above, the objective of NPT Safeguards is limited to "the
timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities" to unknown use or use in
weapons."6 The IAEA certifies annually that no declared nuclear
material has been diverted to military use.'65 Such a conclusion
certifies that the state in question is in compliance with its NPT
Safeguards obligations to not divert material to non-peaceful
purposes. In the case of Iran, the IAEA concluded in its November

160. IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 7 53.
161. See The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 3-12, delivered to the Board of
Governors, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/87 (Nov. 18, 2005) (outlining the IAEA's
ongoing investigation of Iran's past enrichment experiments, which included

analyzing environmental samples, and the discrepancies in Iran's documentation of
these experiments).
162. E.g., Paul Leventhal, Founding President, Nuclear Control Inst., Statement
at the National Press Club on Iran's Nuclear Program (Sept. 16, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.nci.org/05nci/PLpressconferencestatement.htm)

(arguing

that despite three years of investigation, there are still unanswered questions
regarding possible ongoing secret nuclear activities in Iran, and such activities
"have to be assumed to be weapon-related").
163. See Paul Kerr, Iran's Nuclear Efforts, Capabilities Still Murky, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1, 2006, at 27 ("evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons
program remains largely circumstantial").
164. Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, supra note 60, 28.
165. See IAEA, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy
Agency,
17
29-30,
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg.system.pdf
[hereinafter The
Safeguards System] (explaining that the process of annual certification is based on
the accounting, containment, and surveillance of nuclear material).
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2004 report that all declared nuclear materials had been accounted
for and therefore none had been diverted to military purposes. 166 The
IAEA reached this same conclusion in September 2005.167
The IAEA certifies the absence of undeclared nuclear activities
only for states that implement the Additional Protocol. 68 The IAEA
has stated this process will take longer in Iran due to its history of
concealed nuclear activities. 69 The IAEA statement that it is "not yet
in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear
materials or activities," which was true for Iran, as of the IAEA
Safeguards Statement covering 2005, was also true for 45 other
states and Taiwan including the Czech Republic and South Africa. 170
These two states in particular are notable because they have had
additional protocols in force longer than Iran and also operate
nuclear facilities on their territory.' 7 '
Due to its eighteen-year history of concealed nuclear activities, 72
Iran is a special case. However, this non-official quasi status does not
confer any technical rationale for interpreting IAEA conclusions
differently than for any other state. In general, the inability to
conclude the absence of undeclared nuclear activity is caused by an
absence of evidence, which must be meticulously determined from
samples collected over a wide area, and in the case of Iran, over a
very large territory. The obstruction of the verification process, for
instance by a state restricting the activities of IAEA inspectors, could

166. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83, supra note 143, 112.
167. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, supra note 12, 51.
168. See The Safeguards System, supra note 165, 7 46 (explaining that "[a] more

extensive evaluation is performed for each State with a comprehensive safeguards
agreement after its additional protocol enters into force . . . [which] includes
findings related to an initial conclusion about both the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities").
169. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, supra note 12, 51.
170. Safeguards Statementfor 2005, supra note 102,
14-15.
171. See IAEA, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Security:
IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, at 14 (May 2005) (listing
the IAEA's Board of Governors approval of additional protocols for the Czech

Republic in 1999 and South Africa in 2002). Iran's additional protocol was not
approved until 2003. Id.
172. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, supra note 12, Annex 1 (providing that Iran
began its secret plutonium separation experiments in 1987); see also id. 13

(stating that Iran's past clandestine activities related to acquiring centrifuge
technology began in 1987 and continues to be investigated by the IAEA).
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constitute non-compliance for states implementing the Additional
Protocol only if the Board were to find that it could not be assured
that no diversion has occurred.
For some it is tempting to declare, based on the inability of the
IAEA to presently draw a conclusion on the absence of nuclear
activities, that Iran continues to operate concealed facilities and that
any such facilities must be for a military program. However, the
IAEA has cautioned that the lack of a conclusion does not imply
suspicion of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. 7 3 In order to
reach such a conclusion the IAEA must also take into account the
history of concealment and the nature of the declared program as a
whole. Therefore, the resolution of outstanding issues related to the
investigation into Iran's past concealed activities is critical to the
Agency's ability to determine the absence of undeclared materials
and activities, as will be shown in the next section. Beyond
determining that no undeclared activities exist, the IAEA's
investigation into Iran's past concealed activities is essential for the
restoration of confidence in Iran's nuclear program.
Despite the absence of formal legal authority granted by the
Additional Protocol, the IAEA continues to probe into several
outstanding issues relating to discrepancies in Iran's declarations of
past activities. Of these several outstanding issues, the most
important relate to high enriched uranium ("HEU") and low enriched
uranium ("LEU") contamination and the acquisition of P1 and P2
centrifuge technology.' 74 In addition, the Agency continues to
examine the issue of a document that describes the casting of
uranium metal into hemispheric shapes, which would be necessary
for developing a bomb.'7 5 The IAEA also continues to investigate

173. See Leventhal, supra note 162 (restating an assertion by IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei that there is no evidence to support claims that Iran is

working on a nuclear weapons program).
174. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 48.
175. See id. 20 (stating that Iran showed the Agency documents that contained,
among other information, "centrifuge enrichment related drawings, specifications
and supporting documentation provided by the intermediaries ... [and procedures]
for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to
the fabrication of nuclear weapon components").
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discrepancies between its analysis and Iran's declarations of its past
76
plutonium experiments. 1
The more troublesome matter, HEU contamination, has largely
been resolved. The IAEA noted in November 2005 that its analyses
of the contamination "tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement
about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU
contamination."' 77 The IAEA continues to investigate the origin of
LEU and some HEU particles, but it is unlikely that additional
analysis will reveal anything more than additional foreign
contamination, or at worst, a few additional uranium enrichment
experiments. Regardless, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei has indicated that it will be impossible to definitively
locate all sources of LEU contamination, thus necessitating greater
transparency from Iran on the history of its centrifuge program,
above and beyond Iran's formal legal requirements. 78
The Agency continues to investigate the history of Iran's uranium
enrichment program.179 Specifically, Iran has failed to produce
documentation relating to the acquisition of P-1 centrifuge
components during the mid 1990s.180 Iran previously stated that due
to the clandestine nature of its supply network, a single handwritten
document, which it had turned over to the IAEA, is the only
documentation it possesses."' As of its current report, the IAEA still
awaits documentation relating to the shipment of this purchase. 82

176. Iran conducted plutonium separation experiments between 1988 and 1993,
which resulted in the production of 100mg of plutonium. The IAEA continues to
investigate when the plutonium separation took place by analyzing new plutonium
solution samples taken in 2004. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83, supra note 143,
72-78; see also IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 26 (listing the series
of actions the IAEA undertook to clarify the nature and scope of these
experiments, which included meeting with Iranian officials).
177. IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, supra note 12, 12.
178. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, 77 8-9.
179. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159,
15-16 ("Iran has been
requested to provide further clarification of the timing and purpose of certain trips
taken by AEOI staff members in the mid-1990s.").
180. See id.
16 (referring specifically to 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge
components); see also IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, 11 (noting that
while Iran showed the document to the Agency, Iran refused requests to furnish a
copy of the document).
181. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 12 (denying specifically
the existence of written evidence "such as meeting minutes, administrative
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The IAEA has also requested documentation related to the alleged
procurement of P-2 centrifuge components between 1995, when it
acquired the designs, and 2002.183 Iran claims that it did not work on
the centrifuges during this period.'84 The IAEA has recently
confronted Iran with documents related to work allegedly carried out
by a contracting company between 2002 and 2003 and the import of
85
centrifuge components.
As of its latest report, the IAEA is examining the additional
information Iran supplied to the IAEA on this matter.'86 Although
Iran is not required to report the import of centrifuge components
under either its Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol, it
the IAEA with
is obligated, under the Additional Protocol, to provide
87
1
Agency.
the
of
request
the
upon
such information
Only one outstanding issue has a direct implication on Article II.
The IAEA continues to be concerned about the revelation of a
document found in Iran describing the procedures for reducing
uranium gas into metal forms in small quantities and shaping the
metal into hemispheric shapes.' 88 The purpose of such a procedure
would almost certainly be for military use. The IAEA has noted that
since Iran acquired the document in the late 1980s it does not appear

documents, reports, personal notebooks or the like").
182. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, T 11.
183. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 77 18-19 (providing that
Iran continues to state that foreign intermediaries did not deliver P-2 centrifuge
components to Iran and that it did not build P-2 centrifuges during the period of
1995 to 2002).
184. See id. 18 (remarking that "Iran continues to assert that no work was
carried out on P-2 centrifuges... and that at no time during this period did it ever
discuss with the intermediaries the P-2 centrifuge design, or the possible supply of
P-2 centrifuge components").
185. The IAEA inquired about the alleged import to a contracting company of
900 magnets from a foreign entity in mid-2003, to which Iran replied only a
limited number of magnets were delivered. Iran is not required to report the import
such components under either its Safeguards Agreement, Iran Safeguards
Agreement, supra note 144, of the Additional Protocol, Model Additional Protocol,
supra note 94, but is obligated under the Additional Protocol to provide the IAEA
with such information upon the request of the Agency. IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27,,
supra note 66, 19.
186. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, 13.
187. See Model Additional Protocol,supra note 94, art. 2(a)(ix)(b).
188. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, TT 15-16.
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to have ever used any of the procedures described. 189 The latest
report mentions that although Iran has allowed the IAEA to examine
190
the document, it continues to decline to give the Agency a copy.
The IAEA notes that it has seen the same document in other member
states, likely other beneficiaries of the A.Q. Khan network, such as
Libya. 191

The IAEA has indicated that the existence of the document makes
Iran's cooperation on the development of its P-1 program even more
crucial, although it has noted there has been no indication that Iran
has made use of the procedures described in the document. 192 It is
therefore incumbent upon Iran to be as transparent as possible in
order to help allay the fears over its nuclear intentions. The IAEA's
treatment of this issue strongly indicates that the document itself is of
little relevance on its own, despite the political mileage against Iran
that U.S. Ambassador John R. Bolton has gotten out of it. Consistent
with the positions Director General ElBaradei has taken in similar
issues in this case, his concern regarding the uranium metal
document addresses how it affects international confidence in Iran's
program rather than its value as evidence of a weapons program.
The IAEA has stated it will be in a position to conclude that there
are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran only by
obtaining a full understanding of the development and extent of the
centrifuge program. 93 Therefore, the history of Iran's enrichment
program is of critical importance to the IAEA's continued legal
authority to pursue this line of inquiry. Yet the IAEA can only
continue to work towards a conclusion if Iran applies the Additional
Protocol and fulfills the requests of the Agency above its legal
requirements.
189. See id. T 16.
190. See id. T 15-16.
191. See id. 16 (asserting that the IAEA has knowledge that intermediaries and
other member states possessed the Iranian document at issue).
192. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159,
20-22; see also
Diplomacy and Force:Interview: The United Nations' Top Inspector is Prepared
to Issue a Report on Iran's Nuclear Program that Will 'Reverberate Around the
World',
NEWSWEEK,
Jan.
23,
2006,
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2006/newsweek 12012006.html. Here
the IAEA Director General reiterates that there has been no indication of a military
nuclear program in Iran, although he is not in a position to exclude this possibility.
193. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, TT 33-34.
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The authority of the IAEA to conduct an investigation into Iran's
nuclear past is inseparable from its expanded mandate under the
Additional Protocol. In other words, the sole technical purpose of the
ongoing investigation is to allow the IAEA to be in a position to
draw a conclusion under the Additional Protocol that no undeclared
nuclear activities or materials exist in Iran. 194 Following the February
4, 2006 decision of the IAEA to report the Iran dossier to the U.N.
Security Council, Iran reportedly suspended its voluntary
implementation of the Additional Protocol, which it has signed but
not ratified. 195 Absent the implementation of the Additional Protocol,
the finding made in November 2004 that no diversion has occurred,
remains the Board's central conclusion regarding Iran's safeguards
compliance. 196

C. THE SUSPENSION OF FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES
On March 28th, 2006 the President of the Security Council issued
a statement on behalf of the Council calling upon Iran to:
[T]ake the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors,
notably in the first operative paragraph of its resolution
GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the
exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to
resolve outstanding questions, and underlines, in this regard,
the particular importance of re-establishing full and sustained
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, to be verified
by the IAEA. 197
The statement "calls upon Iran to take the steps needed to begin
building confidence.., by fully complying with the requirements set

194. See id. 35.
195. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006,
(f)-(g),
IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006) [hereinafter IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14];
see also IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 159, 31 (outlining Iran's refusal
to continue voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol).
196. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14, supra note 195, 2.
197. President of the U.N. Security Council, Statement on Non-proliferation on
Behalf of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/15 (Mar. 29, 2006)
[hereinafter Statement on Non-proliferation].
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' It describes as requirements the series of
out by the IAEA Board."198
measures identified in the February IAEA Board resolution,
specifically the re-establishment of "full and sustained suspension of
and
activities,"
reprocessing
and
all enrichment-related
reconsideration of the construction of a heavy water research
reactor. 199
The statement refers to these confidence building measures as
requirements. However, operative paragraph 5 of the February Board
resolution refers to these measures as "voluntary, and non legally
binding," in accordance with previous requests by the Board. 00
Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution notes "that outstanding
questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to
the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made
on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary."201 The paragraph,
which lists the measures identified in the present draft elements, does
202
not use the language of requirement.

Operative paragraph 2 "[r]equests the Director General to report to
the Security Council ... that these steps are required. ' 203 However,

the Board does not possess the authority to implement such a request.
The Board may call on Iran to take urgent action if it decides,
pursuant to Article 18 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, that such
action "is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that
nuclear material . . . is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices. '' 2° But the February Board resolution
makes clear that the steps required of Iran are for the purpose of
confidence building, not for assurance against diversion.0 5
Prior to September 2005, the Board had requested Iran to maintain
suspension of all uranium enrichment related activities as a
198. The Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy, Inc., The Iran Nuclear Dilemma
Draft Elements: Points and Recommendations, Mar. 20, 2006, available at

http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/draftelements-mar06.pdf.
199. Statement on Non-proliferation, supra note 197.

200. IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14, supra note 195, 5.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. l.
See id.
Id. 2.
Iran SafeguardsAgreement, supra note 144, art. 18.
See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14, supra note 195, 1.
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voluntary, non-legally binding, confidence building measure,
pending the outcome of all outstanding issues related to the IAEA
investigation. °6 In the present draft elements, suspension of
enrichment related activities is no longer linked to the outcome of the
IAEA investigation. 0 The Security Council has positioned itself to
make suspension a matter of contention removed from authority of
the IAEA to apply and verify safeguards.
When Iran's pattern of concealment of nuclear activities came to
light in 2003,208 a reasonable case could have been made that Iran
should have been denied the right to pursue enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities until it regained the trust of the international
community. However that was not the path taken. Instead, the E.U.
undertook negotiations with Iran intended to achieve "objective
guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful
purposes" and to "equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear,
technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on
security issues. 20 9
Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment and conversion
activities as a "voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal
obligation" to be maintained throughout the duration of
negotiations. 210 The Paris Agreement contains no enforcement
mechanism and only grants the IAEA legal authority to verify its
implementation. In the lead-up to the September 24, 2005 finding of
"non-compliance" by the Board, the United States claimed that the
justification of the finding of non-compliance was the resumption of
206. See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions: Resolution Adopted on
1] August 2005, (d), IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/64 (Aug. 11, 2005).
207. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14, supra note 195, 1.
208. See The Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
32, delivered to the Board of
Governors, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6, 2003) [hereinafter IAEA Doc.
GOV/2003/40] ("Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent
processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the
material was stored and processed.").
209. IAEA, Communication Dated 26 November 2004 Received From the
PermanentRepresentatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the United Kingdom Concerning the Agreement Signed in Paris on 15 November
2004, at 4, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/637 (Nov. 26, 2004).
210. Id. at 3.
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uranium conversion, in violation of the suspension under the Paris
Agreement.21
Under the Paris Agreement negotiating framework "the E3/EU
recognize Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with
its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination"--a phrase
that generally allows for uranium enrichment.1 Presumably, Iran
would have been free to resume such activities following the final
outcome of negotiations. However, in Spring 2005, the E3/EU
changed its position, declaring that the only objective guarantee
would be the absence of enrichment.2"3 Moreover, the E.U., in a
proposal made several days after a deadline agreed to by the parties,
demanded very firm commitments from Iran on forfeiting aspects of
its nuclear program in exchange for a weak and nebulous package of
incentives. 1 4 Notably, there were no security guarantees of any
weight, which is not surprising since the United States was not
directly involved in the discussions.2 5
For its part, Iran had offered to accept an extremely intrusive
safeguard and verification regimen, far beyond what is required by
the Additional Protocol. Iran's March 23, 2005 offer to the E.U.
included the "[c]ontinuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors" at
its nuclear fuel cycle sites, ceilings on the level of enrichment,
limiting the extent of its fuel cycle to only the needs of its power
reactors, and binding national legislation prohibiting the
development of nuclear weapons.2 6 In Iran's estimation these
211. See id. ("To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary

basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and
reprocessing activities, and specifically ... all tests or production at any uranium
conversion installation.").
212. Id.
213. See IAEA, Communication Dated 8 August 2005 Received From the
Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the
Agency, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/651 (Aug. 8, 2005) (expressing disappointment

over Iran's future uranium conversion and requesting Iran not to proceed).
214. See id.

215. See Paul Ingram, PreliminaryAnalysis ofE3/EU Proposalto Iran, (British
American Sec. Info. Council, 2005) (Occasional Paper of International Security
Policy), available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN050811-1ranEU.htm
("The E3/EU do not seem to have had the courage to offer either the substantial,
detailed incentives or a creative, compromise solution on enrichment which could
reasonably have been expected to receive Iran's endorsement.").
216. IAEA,

Communication Dated 1 August 2005 Received From the
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provisions would have been sufficient to objectively guarantee the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program. 1 7 However, as a necessary
condition to maintain the support of the United States in the
negotiating effort, the only objective guarantee acceptable to the E3
21 8
states is the complete cessation of all fuel cycle activities in Iran.
The Paris Agreement is not a binding treaty. The text contains no
expression that the states parties consent to be bound by the
Agreement's terms. The Agreement also lacks the language that
confers binding legal status unto treaties, such as provisions for
ascension, ratification, and deposit. 21 9 The Agreement is analogous to
a memorandum of understanding or a statement of principles that is
used to guide a framework for continued negotiations. 220 The stated
outcome of this negotiations process could conceivably take the form
of a treaty. Therefore a violation of the Paris Agreement represents
nothing more than a breakdown in negotiations.
Negotiations under the Paris Agreement and the suspension of fuel
cycle activities are not required for the resolution of the remaining
verification issues. The outcome of these talks deals specifically with
aspects of civilian nuclear industries, recognized as a sovereign right
under Article IV.22 I They bear no direct relation to Iran's obligations
under the NPT or IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, the
violation of any term of the Paris Agreement cannot be construed to

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, at 3, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/648 (Aug. 1, 2005).
217. See id. (arguing that the proposal "has the potential of providing a
framework in which concerns of all sides are reasonably allayed").
218. See Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Dep't of State, Press Conference on Iran (May
31,
2006)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/67103.htm).
219. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11-17, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (enumerating the requirements that characterize a treaty as
legally binding).
220. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, Sept. 26, 1997,
available at http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/admou.htm.
221. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172
(concluding that "[n]othing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty").
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have any legal impact on the implementation of Iran's Safeguards
Agreement.
The issue of suspension is somewhat of a red herring with no
relation to Iran's obligations under the NPT. The IAEA view is that a
pilot scale enrichment facility in Iran poses no nuclear weapons
proliferation concern.222 Moreover, Iran remains several years away,
at best, from being in the position to begin constructing an industrial
scale enrichment capability. 2 3 While the suspension or cessation of
fuel cycle activities might help reduce international tension on this
matter, it is not necessary for the completion of the IAEA
investigation. In its latest safeguards report the IAEA made the
unusual effort to stress that "safeguards obligations and confidence
building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable.2 24
The report further states that "[t]he implementation of confidence
building measures" that have been the focus of U.N. Security
Council action "is no substitute for the full implementation at all
times of safeguards obligations.

' 225

The IAEA thus suggests that the

confidence building measures are not as important as the safeguards,
which are meant to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to
military use.
In the same paragraph the IAEA states:
In this context, it is also important to note that the Agency's
safeguards judgments and conclusions in the case of Iran, as
in all other cases, are based on verifiable information
available to the Agency, and are therefore, of necessity,
limited to past and present nuclear activities. The Agency
cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on,
future compliance or intentions.226

222. See Michael Spies, Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy, Undeclared
Nuclear Activities and Outstanding Issues: Clean Bill of Health?, May 2006,
available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/undeclared.pdf.
223. See William J. Broad et al., Analysts Say a Nuclear Iran Is Years Away,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at Al (estimating that Iran is at least five to ten years

away from being able to produce its first nuclear weapon).
224. IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/27, supra note 66, 36.

225. Id.
226. Id.
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The subtext of this statement is that while Iran may be in full
compliance with its safeguards obligations, states can still point to its
activities as revealing dubious intentions. Although it is not
mentioned, such suspicions are inherent in the utilization of nuclear
energy. Thus Iran's critics will always be able to say that Iran's
nuclear program could be for weapons, despite whatever conclusions
the Agency derives.

CONCLUSION
There are tendencies, especially in Washington, to regard Iran's
development of a nuclear program as extremely urgent.227 While
there certainly are important issues at stake, with respect to Iran and
to the non-proliferation regime generally, the urgency is overstated.
If Iran makes the political decision to acquire a nuclear weapon, U.S.
governmental and non-governmental analysts believe Iran would
need a minimum of three to five years in order to produce sufficient
HEU for a single weapon. The Director of U.S. National Intelligence,
John Negroponte, recently stated that he believes Iran could develop
228
a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015, up to ten years away.
There remains time for all sides to work toward a mutually
acceptable diplomatic solution.
Beyond the issue of Iran's nuclear program, there remains the
issue of the unchecked proliferation of nuclear fuel cycle technology,
specifically protected by Article IV of the NPT. 229 Regarding this
concern, the U.S. National Security Strategy states that America's
"first objective requires closing a loophole in the Non-Proliferation
227. See David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests
and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irancascade.pdf
(enumerating
the
United States' specific concerns, which include Iran's "plans to resume all its

activities to build, research, develop, and test the P-1 centrifuge," its "resumed
enrichment related activities," its "statements minimizing the significance of its
actions," its "plans to install centrifuges [... ] in the underground buildings of the
main Fuel Enrichment Plan," and the possibility that it could assemble its first
nuclear weapon by 2009).
228. See John D. Negroponte, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Statement at the
National Press Club on Intelligence Reform (Apr. 20, 2006) ("it is still a number of
years off before [Iran is] likely to have enough fissile material to assemble into or
put into a nuclear weapon, perhaps into the next decade").
229. See NPT, supra note 4, art. IV. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
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Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be
used to make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear
power program. 23 °
The leaders responsible for closing this "loophole" have been the
industrialized powers, notably those who operate nuclear fuel cycles
facilities and either possess nuclear weapons or allow them to be
housed on their national territories. The challenge for these states,
which resist divulging their own nuclear options, is that closing the
loophole requires chipping away at one of the core pillars of the
NPT. Many developing and Non-Aligned states, which have been
generally more supportive of Iran's position, are wary of accepting
additional constraints on the development of nuclear technology,
absent demonstrable progress on nuclear disarmament issues. The
2005 NPT Review Conference failed largely because the majority of
states feel insufficient progress has been made toward the total
elimination of nuclear weapons.2 1 Despite progress cited by the
NWS parties, there has been only lackluster implementation of some
provisions agreed to in the outcome document of the 2000 Review
Conference. Indeed, the conference required two and a half weeks
just to agree on how it should refer to the 2000 Disarmament
Obligations.
Recognizing the inextricable link between nuclear energy and
nuclear weapons, states could use Iran's nuclear program as
momentum to work toward the multilateral arrangements called for
by the IAEA Director General ElBaradei. His proposal asks all states
to work toward "multilateral control over the sensitive parts of the
nuclear fuel cycle--enrichment, reprocessing, and the management
and disposal of spent fuel. '23 2 Pending the establishment of
multilateral control of the fuel cycle, all construction of enrichment
and reprocessing facilities would be voluntarily suspended, and Iran
and other states would be given credible nuclear supply assurances.
230. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 20.
231. See Press Briefing, Press Conference on Non-Proliferation Treaty, (May
27,

2005),

available

at

(reporting
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/NPTpc050527.doc.htm
that the President, Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, stated that "very little had been
accomplished" when asked to provide his general assessment of the outcome of the
Conference).
232. Mohamed ElBaradei, supra note 17.
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Movement towards a proliferation-resistant global nuclear fuel cycle
can only be accomplished in a balanced and nondiscriminatory way,
accompanied by a concerted effort to expand use of energy sources
not dependent on nuclear energy or fossil fuels.
The general debate of the 60' session of the U.N. First Committee
on International Security and Disarmament concluded amid a chorus
of "frustration," "disappointment," and "concern" over the failure of
the NPT Review Conference and World Summit to achieve
consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The lack of
forward movement on both these fronts, coupled with the eighth
consecutive year of deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and
the second consecutive failure of the U.N. Disarmament Commission
to agree on an agenda, jeopardizes non-proliferation efforts. The vast
majority of states continue to view the thirteen steps agreed to in the
final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the
unequivocal undertaking decided upon in 1995 as essential actions
for progress on critical non-proliferation goals.233
Following a year of disappointing non-proliferation and
disarmament developments, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
stated:
[W]e cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, until the
regime is buried beneath a cascade of proliferation. Twice
last year, Governments had the chance to strengthen the
foundations of the NPT regime, by agreeing on more robust
IAEA inspections; incentives and guarantees for countries to
forgo enrichment and reprocessing of fissile materials; and
energetic steps to meet disarmament commitments. Both
times, they failed. We cannot afford any more such
squandered chances.234

233. See G.A. Res. 60/72,

4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/72 (Jan. 11, 2006) (urging

parties to continue the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations from
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences).
234. Kofi Annan, Sec'y Gen., United Nations, Address to the United Nations
Association of the United Kingdom: Statesmanship, Confidence-Rebuilding
Required For U.N. Capable of Coping with Today's Crises, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/10332 (Jan. 31, 2006).

